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Chapter 2
Measuring Solvency in the
Social Security System
Stephen C. Goss

Public confidence in the ability of the U.S. social security program to make
expected future benefit payments has been an essential component contributing to the success and popularity of the program since its enactment in
1935. The developmen t and application of measures of solvency have successfully provided advance warning of future financing inadequacy. This
warning has provided policymakers and legislators the time needed to develop thoughtful modifications of the program.
Defining solvency depends on one's view of the role and design of the
social security program. A range of measures of solvency has evolved to
address a variety of concepts of solvency. The current assessment that the
social security program, as presently specified, will not be solvent over the
long-range future has resulted from the application of these measures. Comprehensive amendments to the Social Security Act will be designed to satisfY
these measures of solvency. Therefore, an understanding of these measures
is useful for the upcoming discussion and development oflegislation.
The Social Security Act requires that the Board of Trustees report annually to the Congress providing the expected operations and status of the
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI)
Trust Funds for the next 5 fiscal years and "a statement of the actuarial
status of the Trust Funds." The particular measures used in assessing the
actuarial status of the social security program are the subject of this chapter.
Our measures have been developed to be consistent with the nature of the
program and the manner offinancing, as set forth in the Social Security Act.
The Actuarial Standards Board, in its third draft of the Standard of Practice
for Social Insurance, has specifically instructed that valuation measures and
tests of financial adequacy for social insurance programs be designed to be
consistent with the design and intent of the program financing approach.
As a government-administered social insurance program, social security has

Stephen C. Goss

17

specifically not been subject to the funding req uiremen ts applied for private
pensions and insurance. Therefore, the measures described in this paper
for assessing the actuarial status and solvency of the social security program differ substantially from the measures used for private pensions and
insurance.
Because the social security program is estimated to be inadequately financed over the long run, based on the "best estimate" intermediate assumptions used in the 1997 Trustees Report, future legislative changes al-e
expected to be needed. These changes may retain the basic pay-as-you-go
form of the program, as have other amendments over the past 20 years, or
they may substantially change the nature of the program and its financing.
If substantial changes are made, such as a move toward sustained partial
advance funding or a provision for mandatory individual accounts, then
new measures may be needed to assess the impact and viability of the
new program.

The Nature of Social Insurance and
Social Security Financing
Since its enactment in 1935, the social security system has been managed by
the federal government with dedicated taxes and, since the 1950's, mandatory participation by nearly the entire population. Unlike private pensions
and insurance, this social insurance program is essentially "guaranteed" a
stream of new participants indefinitely into the future. For this reason,
social insurance can be financed without advance funding for accrued future obligations, contrary to the requirements for private pensions and
insurance. While the desirability of such pay-as-you-go financing is debatable, the approach has been implicit in law.
A pay-as-you-go financing approach requires no accumulation of reserves
for advance funding, but the lack of authority to borrow makes it prudent
for the Social Security Administration to maintain a "contingency reserve
fund." Without modest contingency reserves, an unexpected economic
downturn could quickly render the program unable to pay full benefits on a
timely basis. For example, higher than expected inflation would increase
benefits, and lower than expected employment and wages would reduce tax
revenues, resulting in an accumulated "loss" equal to 50 to 100 percent of
the annual cost of the program within about five years. Thus, a contingency
reserve of 100 percent of annual cost (i.e., a 100 percent trust fund ratio)
has been accepted as sufficient to "ride out" an unexpected recession or to
provide time for the enactment of legislation in the event of a more permanent negative turn in economic trends.
As suggested above, the meaning of solvency, or financial adequacy, for a
given period in the context of a social insurance program with pay-as-you-go
financing is that all expected benefits will be payable in full when due
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throughout the period. Reaching and maintaining a projected contingency
reserve of 100 percent of annual cost provides a practical working margin
that accommodates moderate cycles around expected conditions, and allows time for corrective legislation in the event of a negative shift in underlying conditions.
The specified level of payroll taxes has been modified throughout the
history of the social security program, from initial levels of 1 percent for
employers and employees each, to the current level of 6.2 percent each.
Most of this increase is the result of the maturation of a program that started
by taxing essentially all workers while paying benefits only to recent retirees,
but has since reached the state where over 95 percent of the nation's elderly
popUlation is eligible for benefits. Benefit levels have risen and benefits have
been extended to cover additional contingencies such as disability. Since
1935, however, financing has been maintained on a roughly pay-as-you-go
basis with projected reserves rising substantially above 100 percent of annual program cost only for temporary periods.

Measuring Social Security Solvency
The Social Security Act requires an annual report on both the status of the
trust funds for the next five years and a statement of the "actuarial status" of
the funds for the long-range future. Differen t measures ofsolvency, or financial adequacy, have been developed for the (1 o-year) short range period and
the (75-year) long range period.

Short-Range Measures
Solvency is defined as the expectation that benefits will be payable in full
when due, so it is sufficient to examine projected trust fund levels over the
next decade. If trust funds are not exhausted during this period, then the
program is projected to be solvent in the short range period.
Based on the recommendation of the Technical Panel on Assumptions
and Methods appointed by the 1991 Advisory Council, a short range test of
financial adequacy has been adopted that requires that (1) the trust fund
ratio remain at or above 100 percentthrough the next 10 years, if it is at least
100 percent initially; or (2) the trust fund ratio rise to at least 100 percent by
the end of 5 years and remain at or above 100 percent for an additional 5
years, and that benefits are payable in full when due throughout the next 10
years, if the trust fund ratio is below 100 percent initially. This test adds the
practical requirement that a contingency reserve be developed and maintained. For the 1997 Trustees Report, the combined OASI and DI Trust
Funds were projected to remain above 100 percent of annual cost for
the next 10 years under the intermediate alternative II assumptions. The
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social security program was thus found to meet the test of short range
financial adequacy.

Long-Range Measures
The actuarial status over the long term has been analyzed using a number of
measures. An examination of annual values for a 75-year period (or longer)
being cumbersome, a number of single-value summarized measures and
indicators have been developed over the years.
Actuarial Balance. This most basic and useful summarized measure has
been designed to provide a value of zero when the program is projected to
be financed precisely on a pay-as-you-go basis, on average, over a specified
valuation period. The actuarial balance is defined as the difference between
the long-range summarized income rate (tax revenue) and the long-range
summarized cost rate (benefit payout). However, the method of summarization, the length of the long-range period, and the components included in
cost and income have all changed over the years.
Prior to 1965, projections were made into perpetuity. The long-range
summarized cost rate was defined as the present value of projected future
cost into perpetuity divided by the present value of projected future taxable
payroll into perpetuity. Summarized income rates were defined as the present value of projected future payroll taxes divided by the present value of
projected future taxable payro]].
In the 1965 Trustees Report, the long-range valuation period was changed
to 75 years, reflecting the recommendation of the latest Advisory Council.
Estimates had been assumed to level off after 85 or 90 years and the Council
felt that it served "no useful purpose to present estimates as if they had
validity into perpetuity" (Board of Trustees, 1965: 68). The 75-year period
encompasses essentially the entire future life span of all current workers and
beneficiaries, even the youngest current workers, at the beginning of the 75year pel"iod.ltalso provides a projection period long enough to illustrate the
complete and mature effects of past amendments and potential future
changes to the Social Security Act. Restricting the long-range period to 75
years lowered the estimated long range cost by only about three percent in
1965, largely because estimates were made on a level cost basis, discounted
by the full expected trust fund interest rate.
Under the level-cost approach, no increase in either the average wage
level or the level of prices was assumed for the future. This approach was
developed because the law at that time provided for no automatic increase
in either the maximum taxable wage or the benefit formula. While "present
law" estimates for the Trustees Report could not explicitly presume the
enactment of likely changes in future legislation, the use of constant future price and wage levels made implicit the assumption of such changes.
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But when projections were made assuming no increase in either price or
average-wage levels, discounting by the full assumed nominal interest rate
meant that the summarized long-range cost and income rates put very little
weight on benefits, payroll, and taxes for distant future years. Thus, inclusion of estimated values for years beyond the 75th projection year in the
summarized rates made little difference.
With the adoption of automatic benefit indexing and automatic indexing
of the maximum taxable earnings level in the 1972 Social Security Amendments, dynamic assumptions were used beginning with the 1973 Trustees
Report. Under dynamic assumptions, explicit increases in average wage and
price levels were specified for the future projections. The 1973 Trustees
Report also changed the method of summarizing cost and income rates. As
a matter of simplification, an approximation of the present-value approach
was adopted. Under this approach, the summarized cost rate was computed
as the arithmetic average ofthe annual cost rates for the 75 years in the longrange period. The summarized income rate was defined similarly. This approach, called the "average cost method," was retained through the 1987
Trustees Report. The average cost method is equivalent to the present value
method where the growth rate in the aggregate taxable payroll is used as the
annual discount rate. This approach was deemed appropriate at the time
because it yielded values that were very close to present-value calculations
(the growth in aggregate taxable payroll was very close to the current interest rate on the trust funds), and the summarized rates were more easily
replicated without access to main-frame computers.
In 1988, calculation of the summarized cost and income rates returned to
the present value method. Trust fund interest rates had become substantially different (larger) than the growth rate in aggregate taxable payroll,
and computers and programmable calculators had become widely available.
These last two changes in the actuarial balance were to include the starting
trust fund balance in the summarized income rate (beginning with the 1988
report) and to include the present value of a target trust fund balance equal
to 100 percent of annual cost in the summarized cost rate (beginning with
the 1991 report). With these changes, exact actuarial balance (i.e., an actuarial balance of zero) indicates that the present value of projected income
over the next 75 years, along with the starting trust fund balance, is enough
to cover the present value of all costs over the next 75 years, leaving a trust
fund balance equal to 100 percent of annual outgo at the end of the period.
Table 1 indicates the projected actuarial balances for the social security
(OASDI) program based on the Trustees' intermediate assumptions of
Trustees Reports for years 1973 through 1997. Evident in these estimates of
OASDI actuarial balance are the large improvements made at the enactment of the 1977 and 1983 Social Security Amendments, and the deterioration of the actuarial balance before and after these amendments. The
size of the actuarial deficit immediately prior to enactment of the 1983
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Summarized Long-Range (75-Year) OASDI Rates Based on Intermediate
Assumptions

Yearo!
Report

Summarized
Cost Rate

Summarized
Income Rate (%)

Actuarial
Balance (%)

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

10.95%
13.89
16.26
18.93
19.19

10.63
\0.91
10.94
10.97
10.99

-0.32
-2.98
-5.32
-7.96
-8.20

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

13.55
13.38
13.74
14.08
14.09

12.16
12.19
12.22
12.25
12.27

-1.40
-1.20
-1.52
-1.82
-1.82

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

12.84
12.95
13.35
13.40
13.51

12.87
12.90
12.94
12.96
12.89

0.02
-0.06
-0.41
-0.44
-0.62

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

13.52
13.72
13.95
14.19
14.63

12.94
13.02
13.04
13.11
13.16

-0.58
-0.70
-0.91
-1.08
-1.46

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

14.67
15.37
15.44
15.52
15.60

13.21
13.24
13.27
13.33
13.37

-1.46
-2.13
-2.17
-2.19
-2.23

Source: Annual OASDI Trustees RepOrL'i.
Note: Alternat;ve II·B for years 1981-90. alternative 1I for all other years.

Amendments, based on preliminary intermediate assumptions for the 1983
Trustees Report, was 2.09 percem of taxable payroll. Estimated actuarial
deficits have once again exceeded this level since the 1994 Trustees' Report.
The deterioration of the OASDI actuarial balance since enactment of the
1983 Amendmen ts is the result of changes in five areas. Changes in (1) economic assumptions, (2) disability experience and assumptions, (3) actuarial
projection methods, and (4) the starting and ending year of the 75-year
valuation period have each worsened the actuarial balance by an amount
equal to about one-third of the current actuarial deficit. Changes in (5) demographic experience and assumptions have improved the actuarial balance by an amoun t equal to about one-third of the current actuarial deficit.
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The size of an estimated actuarial deficit may be usefully characterized as
the magnitude of the increase in the combined payroll tax rate that would
be needed to eliminate the actuarial deficit, effective at the beginning of the
valuation period, thus restoring solvency for the program over the longrange period. It must be noted, however, that this is merely a convenient
characterization, and that an infinite number of solutions involving benefit
reductions and/ or revenue increases would similarly eliminate the actuarial
deficit.
Advancing the starting and ending year of the valuation period for each
annual Trustees' Report currently increases the size of the actuarial deficit
by 0.08 percent of taxable payroll. This worsening is the result of the inclusion of an additional year (the 76th year of the prior Trustees Report projection) which has a substantially larger deficit than the other years in the
period, on average. The first year of the prior Trustees Report valuation
period is not excluded from the new valuation, because the net operations
for that year, and for all prior years, are reflected in the starting trust fund
balance, which has been included in the summarized income rate since the
1988 Trustees Report.
As mentioned earlier, the long-range valuation period was limited to 75
years, starting in the 1965 report, to avoid dominating the actuarial balance
with the level of annual balances at and beyond the 75th projection year. If
the actuarial balance had been computed into perpetuity for the 1996 report, an OASDI actuarial deficit of about 4.7 percent of taxable payroll
would have been calculated. This value is much closer to the annual deficit
of 5.51 percent of payroll estimated for 2070 than it is to the actuarial balance for the 75-year valuation period 1996-2070 of 2.19 percent of payroll.
Annual Cost Rates, Income Rates, and Balances. Annual cost and income
rates are computed as the dollar annual cost and annual tax income, respectively, divided by the annual taxable payroll. Cost includes both benefits and
administrative expense. Tax income includes both payroll tax receipts and
revenue transferred to the trust funds from the general fund of the United
States Treasury equal to the amount collected for federal income taxation
of OASDI benefits beginning in 1984 (a portion of this amount is also
allocated to the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund).
The annual balance is the difference between the annual income rate and
the annual cost rate. Because interest income is excluded from the annual
income rate, the annual balance indicates how close the program is to
operating on a pay-as-you-go basis for the year. Excluding interest from the
income rate also makes sense because the interest is needed primarily to
maintain the level of the contingency reserve. The interest rate on trust
fund assets is close enough to the rate of in crease in aggregate program cost
so that interest on the assets is just about the amount needed to maintain a
constant trust fund ratio (assets to annual cost) from the beginning to the
end of the year, particularly for a relatively small contingency reserve fund.
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TABLE 2. Projected OASDI Annual Cost Rates, Income Rates and Balances, and
Cost as a Percentage ofCDP, Based on the Intermediate Assumptions of
the 1997 Trustees Report
OASDI
Annual Rate as % ofPayroll
Year

Income

Cost

Balance

1996
2010
2030
2070

12.63
12.73
13.09
13.32

11.49
12.48
17.47
19.18

0.26
-4.38
-5.86

1.14

OASDI
Cost as % of
CDP

4.66
4.87
6.57
6.68

Source: 1997 OASDI Trustees Report

In addition, annual cost rates are useful as an indication of the cost to
society of providing benefits, regardless of how the cost is financed. Similarly, annual cost as a percentage of GOP is a useful indicator of the cost of
the program to the society.
Table 2 provides selected annual rates based on the intermediate assumptions of the 1997 Trustees Report. These rates indicate the dramatic rise in
the cost rate, both as a percentage of payroll and as a percentage of GOP, as
the baby-boom generation retires between 2010 and 2030. Increases both
before and after this period are relatively modest. Cost rates do not drop
back down to earlier levels as the baby-boom generation dies off. The continuing increase in cost rates after 2030 reflects the assumed continued
increase in life expectancy, primarily after reaching retirement age, and the
ultimate total fertility rate at a level of 1.9 children per woman. Figure I
(from the 1997 Trustees Report) illustrates projected annual cost and income rates for the OASDI program under the intermediate alternative II as
well as under the low-<.:ost alternative I and the high-cost alternative III
assumptions.
The size of the annual balance at the end of the period is of particular
interest. If the annual balance at the end of the period differs significantly
from the actuarial balance for the period, then the actuarial balance for the
next Trustees Report will move in the direction of the ending annual balance. The relationship between the ending (75th year) income rate and
cost rate is also indicative of the proportion of projected program cost that is
covered by the specified tax revenues in the law. For example, based on the
values in Table 2 for the intermediate assumptions of the 1997 Trustees
Report, the projected tax revenues alone would cover about 74 percent of
program cost in 2029, the year of combined trust fund exhaustion, and
about 68 percent of program cost by 2071. The percentage of cost covered
by specified tax rates indicates the relative extent that benefits would need
to be reduced, or revenue increased, in order to achieve balance between
the annual income and cost rates.

-----------_._--
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Figure I. Estimated OASDI income and cost rates by alternative. calendar years 198.')-2075 (% of taxable
payroll). Source: 1997 OASDI Trustees Report.
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Trust Fund Ratios, Year of Trust Fund Exhaustion, and Stability at the End. The
trust fund ratio is, of course the ultimate measure of solvency, defined as the
ability to pay all benefits in full when due. The date oftrust fund exhaustion,
which would occur during the year 2029 for the combined OASDI program
based on the intermediate assumptions of 1997 Trustees Report, is of particular significance. Figure 2 (from the 1997 Trustees Report) illustrates the
projected trust fund ratios under each of the three alternatives.
It is worth noting that the combined trust funds are not exhausted during
the 7S-year long-range projection period under the low-cost alternative I
assumptions (the alternative I and III assumptions will be discussed further
below). The trust fund ratios for alternative I serve to illustrate two additional considerations. First, the actuarial balance for a valuation period is
direcdy related to the trust fund ratio at the end of the period. A trust fund
ratio of 100 percent is, of course, associated with an actuarial balance of
zero, with a positive actuarial balance indicating an ending balance greater
than 100 percent and a negative actuarial balance indicating an ending
trust fund ratio of less than 100 percent. In practice, under present law, a
negative trust fund ratio is not possible because there is no authority to
borrow.
The second consideration regarding the ending trust fund ratio is the
stability of the ratio around the end of the valuation period. If the trust fund
ratio is stable at the end of the long-range period, we can be assured that in
the absence of major changes in assumptions, the actuarial balance for the
cun-ent Trustees Report will change litde for subsequent reports for the
foreseeable future. This results from the fact that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the trust fund ratio and the actuarial balance. A
stable trust fund ratio implies a stable actuarial balance. For this reason,
most recent proposals to eliminate the long-range OASDI actuarial deficit
have also been designed to achieve a stable trust fund ratio at the end of the
long-range period (like that illustrated under alternative I assumptions).
This is true for the each of the proposals of the 1994-96 Advisory Council
and S. 82S, proposed earlier by Senators Kerrey and Simpson.
Test of Long-Range Close Actuarial Balance. This test is not a test of solvency
or financial adequacy. It represents an attempt to characterize, with a singlevalue summarized measure, whether the program is at least close to being
solvent throughout the long-range 7S-year period. The requirement for
being only close to solvent is intended to reflect the inherent uncertainty in
making projections very far into the future.
For many years the test of close actuarial balance required that the summarized long-range income rate be between 9S and lOS percent of the
summarized long-range cost rate. When the income rate was near the lower
end of the range, the trust fund would be exhausted prior to the end of the
long-range period, but the financing of the program would arguably be
within "striking distance" of the level needed to achieve solvency. The range

20% -

15%

---

Actuarialb-alanceaspercentage
of summarized cost rate

~

Minimum allowable balance

10%
iOASI

5%
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2021
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2036

2041
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Figure 2. Comparison of estimated long-range actuarial balance with the minimum allowable for close actuarial balance (Alternative II) by trust fund. Source: 1997 OASDI Trustees Report.
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of "tolerance" allowed that there would be no call for corrective legislation
as long as the size of the actual;al balance or deficit was small. When the size
of the actuarial balance or deficit grew larger, more than 5 percent of the
cost rate, then a need to begin serious study toward enactment of corrective legislation would be indicated. Significantly, this earlier version of the
test called for action not only when the program was significantly underfinanced relative to pay-as-you-go financing, but also when the program was
significantly over-financed relative to pay-as-you-go financing.
Based on the recommendation of the Technical Panel on Assumptions
and Methods appointed by the 1991 Advisory Council, the test for close
actuarial balance was modified in two ways. First, the "upper limit" for
actuarial balance was removed. This was done in recognition of the fact that
the 1977 and 1983 amendments both provided for temporary advance funding substantially in excess of the contingency reserve level. The temporary
advance funding was described as a way to alleviate some of the burden on
workers during the retirement years of the baby-boom generation by having
the baby-boom generation contribute more than necessary for pay-as-yougo financing during their working years to establish reserves that could be
utilized when they retired.
Second, the test was subdivided into 66 separate sub-tests, each of which
must be passed in order to meet the test of close actuarial balance. These
sub-tests are based on the 66 valuation periods, each beginning with the
initial projection year, the first ending with the lOth projection year, and
each successive period extending one year so that the 66th sub-period encompasses the entire 75-year period. The maximum permissible size for an
actuarial deficit is zero percent of the summarized cost rate for the first
period and 5 percent of the summarized cost rate for the 66th period; the
permissible percentage is linearly interpolated for intervening periods. This
expansion of the test assures that a program will not be found to be in close
actuarial balance if it meets the test condition for the full long-range period
(the 66th sub-period) but has a substantially larger deficit for a shorter period. Figure 3 illustrates how nearly the OASI, DI, and combined OASDI
programs meet the test based on the intermediate assumptions of the 1997
Trustees Report.
The OASI program meets the test for valuation periods of length 10
through 33 years. The DI program meets the test only for valuation periods
of length 10 through 12 years. The combined OASDI program meets the
test for valuation periods oflength 10 through 30 years. In each case, the test
is not met for longer periods. Therefore, under the intermediate assumptions of the 1997 Trustees Report, each of the programs fails the test for
long-range close actuarial balance.
It is not apparent that failure of the test for close actuarial balance alone
has been particularly successful in motivating serious movement toward
corrective legislation in the social security program. The 1977 Amendments
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Figure 3. Estimated trust fund ratios, OASOJ and OJ trust funds combined, by alternative, calendar years
1985-2075 (assets as % of annual expenditures). Source: 1997 OAS01 Trustees Report.
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failed to bring the OASDI progl-am within the limits of close actuarial balance; the test was not passed until 6 years later when the 1983 Amendments,
motivated in part by a near-term solvency crisis, eliminated the long-range
deficit altogether. Only six years later, in the 1989 report, the program was
again out of close actuarial balance, and continues to be so today without
immediate prospect for correction. The lack of a near-term OASDI financing crisis and the greater immediacy of the financial shortfall of the Medicare Hospital Insurance program are largely responsible.

Variation, Stochastic Simulation, and Sensitivity Testing
Due to the inherent uncertainty in projections of future experience, it is
desirable to convey some sense of the plausible range of possible future
conditions. This can be accomplished either with specified sets of assumptions that are intended to illustrate this variation or with stochastically varying scenarios that provide a sense of how likely it is that the true actuarial
status of the program will turn out to be within a given distance range
around the actuarial status based on intermediate projections.

Variation in Alternatives
For many years, Trustees Reports have provided projections for at least
three full scenarios intended to describe a plausible range of possible longterm outcomes. For this purpose the intermediate alternative II assumptions, which represent the best guess of what future economic and demographic conditions will hold, are modified in each element to create the
low-eost alternative I and the high-eost alternative III sets of assumptions.
For these variations, the individual elements of the assumption set are varied by selecting levels around the intermediate assumption that are thought
to be quite unlikely to be achieved on the average in the long run, but are,
nonetheless, plausible. In this manner, each element is modified, generally
in the direction that tends to result in lower program cost for alternative I
a:1d higher cost for alternative III.
The selection of assumptions on this basis results in variation of many
elements from the intermediate assumptions in ways that are inconsistent
with interrelationships among elements observed in past data. Thus, the
low-cost and high-eost alternatives incorporate, by the method of their construction, an additional reinforcing element that moves toward low or high
cost, that of structural change in the historical relationship among elements. In this way it is intended that alternatives will describe a fairly wide
range of variation that is likely to encompass future experience.
Figures earlier in this chapter illustrate the range of variation in several
measures of solvency based on these assumptions. Alternative I assumptions
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result in projected cost rates that are very close to projected income rates,
and trust fund ratios that are stable or rising. Alternative III assumptions, on
the other hand, result in projected trust fund exhaustion substantially
sooner than under the intermediate assumptions.

Stochastic Simulation
Stochastic simulation of future long-range economic and demographic
trends and their interrelationships would provide a quantitatively, rather
than qualitatively, derived basis for illustrating possible future variation in
the measures of solvency of the social security program. On the plus side, it
would provide a clearly defined probability distribution of measures like
year of trust fund exhaustion and actuarial balance. On the minus side, it
would not provide unambiguous sets of assumptions that are consistent with
the various points in the distribution.
The initial challenge in developing a meaningful stochastic simulation of
long-range ultimate trends is to determine what are reasonable distributions
for the various elements in the assumption set. It is quite a different matter to
establish a probability distribution for long-range 75-year trends in a variable
than it is to establish year-ta-year stochastic variation around a specified
central trend. The latter distribution is readily specified using data for the
past 2 or 3 decades or so. But to specifY the distribution of possible 75-year
trends requires either data for a very long period encompassing a number of
independent 75-year periods where underlying conditions are reasonably
similar to expected future conditions, or a presumption about the nature of
the distribution. Because appropriate long-term data are not available, the
distribution for each element must be based on presumption. The validity of
the distribution of the measures of solvency can only be as good as the
presumed distributions for the elements and their interrelationships.
The more fundamental question, however, is for what specific purpose is
the stochastic variation in measures of solvency might be useful. It is clear
that for private insurance, where the solvency of the insurer is essential, and
the insurer cannot rewrite the terms of the contract after the insurance is
issued, a probability distribution of outcomes is needed. The insurer must
charge premiums that are large enough to ensure that the risk of having
expenses (losses) in excess of premium income is acceptably small. And
even a small risk of excessive expense may be covered with reinsurance.
Social insurance is different from private insurance in several ways. First,
social insurance is not a contractual obligation, or liability. The insurer, the
Federal Government, can unilaterally modifY the terms of the plan if expenses turn out to be either higher or lower than expected. The 1977 and
1983 Social Security Amendments are examples of such action by the government where substantial reductions in future benefits were enacted, including benefits for current beneficiaries and fully insured workers. For this
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reason, social insurance can be financed based on the expected cost, and
not on the basis of something higher in order to avoid unsustainable losses.
The government retains the right to lower benefits or raise taxes unilaterally; if either gains or losses occur, the plan can be modified. Moreover,
it can be argued that the government should not charge more than the
expected cost for social insurance. It is the ultimate reinsurer and does not
set premiums with the expectation of profit. If we conclude that the government can, or even should, charge for social insurance on the basis of expected cost, then the prime function of stochastic simulation for private
insurance would appear not to apply to social insurance.

Sensitivity Testing
The Trustees Reports provide summarized cost and income rates and actuarial balances projected on the basis of the intermediate assumptions in all
respects except that each of the elements of the set of economic and demographic assumptions is, in turn, replaced with the high-cost and the low-cost
values. This provides an additional measure of the sensitivity of the program
to variation beyond that provided by projections based on the three alternative sets of assumptions.
Specifically, this sensitivity testing allows readers of the Trustees Reports
who disagree with one or more of the elements of the assumptions to estimate roughly how much the solvency of the program, as measured by
the actuarial balance, would be affected by modifying the assumption(s)
in question.

Other Measures of Solvency
Several important measures of solvency for pension and insurance plans are
based on and expressed in dollar amounts, generally present-value dollar
amounts. These include the open-group surplus or deficit for a social insurance program, the closed group (to new entrants) surplus or deficiency ofa
plan, and the plan-termination unfunded accrued liability of a private pension or insurance plan. Each of these has a possible application to the social
security program.
The open group concept is consistent with the pay-as-you-go financing
approach and is thus directly applicable for the social security program.
This can be referred to as the open-group unfunded obligation for social
security. The term obligation is used in lieu of the term liability, because
liability indicates a contractual obligation (as in the case of private insurance) that cannot be altered by the plan sponsor without the agreement of
the plan participan ts.
The closed group (to new entrants, i.e., persons just reaching working
age) surplus or deficiency may have specific application in cases like that
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of the Federal Government closing the Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) plan to pel-sons newly hired after 1983. This is a concept that is only
appropriate to a plan that has been intended to be fully advance funded,
such as plans covered under ERISA. For a social insurance plan that was
designed to be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with the expectation of a
continuing pool of new entrants, like social security, this concept cannot
apply as a measure of solvency because it is inconsistent with the design and
intent of the program. However, the concept can apply in the context of a
continuing program that is converting to another form, where there is a
desire to keep the financing of the old and new forms of the program
separate. In this case the closed group surplus or deficit may be referred to
as the closed group (to new entrants) transition gain or cost.
Similarly, the plan-termination unfunded accrued obligation concept
may be applied when a continuing plan that has been financed on a pay-asyou-go basis is being converted to a new form that will apply not only for new
entrants but also with respect to all future taxes or premiums of still-active
workers. In this case, the unfunded obligation of the old form may be
referred to as the maximum transition cost.

Open Group SurplUS or Deficiency
The open group surplus or deficiency is essentially equivalent to the actuarial balance as it was produced for the 1988 through 1990 Trustees Reports.
That is, it is the difference between (a) the present value ofthe projected tax
income over the next 75 years plus trust fund assets at the beginning of the
period and (b) the present value of projected cost of the program over the
next 75 years. This measure differs from the actuarial balance concept used
in 1988-90 only in that the open group surplus or deficiency is not divided
by the present value of taxable payroll over the 75-yeal- projection period. It
further differs from the concept of actuarial balance used since 1991 in that
it excludes the cost of building and maintaining a contingency reserve by
the end of the period. Table 3 lists estimates of open group surplus and
deficiency provided over the years to the Department of the Treasury for
their annual reports "Statement of Liabilities and Other Financial Commitments of United States Government ... " These values are consistent with
estimates based on the intermediate assumptions of the Trustees Report of
the year of the valuation date; in some cases estimates of the starting fund
balance are updated and the effects oflegislation enacted after the Trustees
Report are included.

Closed Group

fto New Entrants) Transition Gain or Cost

This value was provided to the Department of the Treasury for inclusion in
the report cited above through 1994. Since 1995 this value has been judged
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TABLE 3. OASDI Open Group Surplus or Deficiency and Closed Group (to New
Entrants) for the OASDI Program, for Valuation Years 1973 Through
1997 (billions of$)

Valuation
Year

75-Year
Open Croup
Surplus or
Deficiency (- )

7/1/1973
7/1/1974
7/ I / 1975
10/1/1976
10/1/1977
10/1/1978
10/1/1979
10/1/1980
10/1/1981
10/1/1982
10/1/1983
10/1/1984
10/1/1985
10/1/1986
10/1/1987
10/1/1988
10/1/1989
10/1/1990
10/1/1991
10/1/1992
10/1/1993
10/ I / 1994
10/1/1995
10/1/1996
10/1/1997

-176
-1,312
-2,027
-4,176
-4,787
-930
-848
-1,464
-1,555
-1,641
+148
+37
-269
-343
-378
-664
-850
-1,244
-1,185
-1,773
-1,864
-2,838
-2,833
-3,094
-2,922

100 Year
Closed Group
(to New Entrants)
Transition
Gain aT Cost (- )

-2,118
~2,460

-2,710
-4,148
-5,362
-3,971
-4,225
-5,601
-5,858
-5,808
-5,059
-4,208
-4,647
-5,394
-5,580
-5,740
-6,098
~7,121

-6,595
-7,376
-7,201
-8,390
-8,129
-8,856
-7,913

Lowest
Age in
Closed Croup

Ultimate
Valuation
Interest
Rate (%)

23
19
20
21
17
18
19
15
16
17
18
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

6.00
6.00
7.38
6.60
6.60
6.60
6.60
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.08
6.39
6.39
6.39
6.39
6.39
6.39
6.29

Source: Annual Issues of "Statement of Liabilities and Other Financial Commiunent'i of the
United States Government . . ." from the Department of the Treasury and unpublished esti-

mates from the Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration

to be inappropriate for inclusion in the report of liabilities and other commitments. These values are included in Table 3 representing the closedgroup transition gain or cost for continuing the social security program in
another form for new entrants on the valuation date and later and for
evaluating the old and new benefit forms separately.
The values in Table 3 are present values discounted to the valuation date
and thus represent current dollars on the valuation date. Therefore, they
tend to increase by the annual valuation interest rate from one valuation to
the next, in the absence of any change in assumptions, methods, or the
benefit and financing provisions of the program.
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Maximum Transition Cost
Thi~

value represents the transition cost for continuing the social security
program in a different form, with all payroll taxes for work after the valuation date credited to the new benefit form. The maximum transition cost is
computed as the difference between (a) the value of the assets on the
valuation date plus the present value of revenue from taxation of future
benefits payable on the old form and (b) the present value of all future
benefits payable after the valuation date based on earnings credited under
the old form, that is, based on earnings prior to the valuation date. Based on
the intermediate assumptions of the 1997 Trustees Report, the maximum
transition cost computed on this basis is $8,927 billion for a valuation date of
10/1/97 and a 1000year valuation period.
This value is only 13 percent greater than the c1osed-group-to-newentrant transition cost for the same period and valuation date. The difference between these two measures is equal to the difference between (a) the
present value of future payroll taxes payable by the closed group after the
valuation date plus the present value of revenue from taxation of benefits
earned based on these payroll taxes, and (b) the present value of additional
benefits earned under the old form (beyond the past service credits described below) based on these payroll taxes. This means that the incremental revenue (a) is only slightly larger than the incremental benefits
(b) described above.
Future benefits under the old form for workers who have not yet reached
benefit eligibility age (62) are calculated on a proportional past service
credit basis. The approach is similar to the approach developed for past
service credits under the Personal Security Account (PSA) plan for the
1994-96 Advisory Council. The balance of this section describes the detailed method for computing the past service credits for the interested
reader.
For each such worker, a monthly benefit amount based on the old form
would be computed on the valuation date as if the worker had become
disabled. For workers who survive without disability to retirement eligibility
age (62). this amount would be indexed by the average wage in the national
economy and multiplied by the proportioning factor derived as P = (age on
valuation date - 22) /40.
For individuals who are disabled continuously from the valuation date
until the earlier of death or reaching retirement conversion age (their normal retirement age under the old form), all future benefits payable on the
account will be as under the old form. For individuals disabled on the
valuation date who recover from disability before reaching retirement eligibility age (62) and survive, disability benefits before retirement age continue under the old form and benefits after reaching retirement eligibility
age are the combination of (a) the final disability monthly benefit payment
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wage indexed to retirement age and multiplied by the factor D = (years
disabled between 22 and 62) /40, and (b) the monthly disability benefit
payable on the valuation date, wage indexed to retirement age and multiplied by the factor P' = (non-disabled years between 22 and the valuation
date) /40. Finally, for individuals who are not disabled on the valuation date
but who become disabled thereafter, but before retirement eligibility age,
disability benefits are equal to the old form disability benefit computed as if
disabled on the valuation date, wage indexed to the date of disability, and
multiplied by the factor D' = (age on valuation date - 22) / (age at disability - 22). Benefits at retirement conversion are computed in the same manner as for the individual who is disabled on the valuation date but recovers.

Conclusion
As with any pension or insurance plan, measuring the solvency of the social
security system requires careful attention to the nature of the program and
its intended financing method. The U.S. social security program is a social
insurance plan, meaning that it expects a steady stream of mandatory participants in the future. For this reason, the program has been financed
essentially on a pay-as-you-go basis since its early years, with only temporary
periods of partial advance funding like the one we are entering as a result of
the provisions of the 1977 and 1983 Amendments.
Because the social security program is financed on an essentially pay-asyou-go basis and has a guaranteed stream of new participants in the future,
appropriate measures of solvency have been developed and are presented
annually by the Trustees in their report to the Congress. These measures
include the actuarial balance, annual cost and income rates and balances,
annual trust fund ratios and the projected year of trust fund exhaustion, the
short range test of financial adequacy and the long-range test of close actuarial balance, and of more recent interest, the size of the annual balance
(deficit) at the end of the long-range 75-year projection period and the
stability of the trust fund ratio at the end of the period. The combination of
these measures provides an array of analytical information intended to assist
policymakers, including the President and the Congress, in assessing the
actuarial status of the program under current law and the financial implications of the numerous changes to the program that are considered
each year.
Absent from the list of measures generally used to assess the solvency of
the social security program are such measures as unfunded accrued liability.
This measure is entirely appropriate in assessing the solvency of a private
pension or insurance program that must by law be fully advance funded at
all times, because a cessation of new entrants is always a possibility.
Among the proposals being studied for the correction of the current
projected actuarial deficit for social security are a variety of plans that would
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fundamentally modifY the social security program. These proposals would
not terminate social security but would modifY its form, retaining a substantial mandatory plan providing retirement, survivors, and disability benefits
as does the current system. Interestingly, these proposals do present a use
for a measure like the unfunded accrued liabili ty that is necessary for fully
advance funded plans. The usefulness of the deficit measure in the context
of social security is that it represents the maximum potential transition cost
that may be incurred in modifYing the current social security program into a
fully advance-funded defined contribution individual savings plan. This fact
was pointed out by Carolyn Weaver and others during the proceedings of
the 1994-96 Advisory Council.
Any measure of solvency, especially in the long run (75 years), can only be
as accurate as the assumptions used in its application, but the measures
described above appear to be accomplishing their purpose. Interest in the
long-range financing of the program has seldom been greater. And with the
tools now available to make more exhaustive calculations more rapidly than
ever before, there is every prospect that the next comprehensive amendments to the Social Security Act will produce a financing structure more
robust than any previous one.
Of course, this does not mean that the social security program will be
either fixed or "set" forever by the next amendments. Members of every
generation have had and will have their own ideas about the type of social
insurance system they desire. After all, it is the system's ability to be retailored to some extent for each generation that has helped maintain its
broad appeal for over 60 years.
The author wishes to acknowledge members of the Office of the Chief
Actuary at the Social Security Administration, past and present, for their
dedication and effort in developing the measures discussed in this chapter.
Seung An, Orlo Nichols, and William Ritchie have been instrumental in
developing the measures and estimates of solvency presented here and in
the annual reports of the Social Security Board of Trustees. Opinions are
solely those of the author.
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